BOOK REVIEWS
exhaustive rather than selective. For the instructor's use, that may be desirable,
though very few instructors would be able to read all of this material in preparation for
teaching the course for the first time, and certainly no one could expect any student
to become familiar with even a small fraction of it. It is at least open to question if the
books would have been more useful to the students if the editors had undertaken the
task of selecting from this mass of material only so much of the best as it would be possible for him to read. How far are we justified in expecting a student to pay for material which is useless to him but which saves the instructor a good deal of time that would
otherwise have to be spent on digests and indexes? But there is no question that this
material would be of immense value to any practicing lawyer who has cases in the field
covered by these collections. Either book will give him excerpts from much material
to which he could not otherwise have access without considerable trouble, and besides
will give him references to practically all of the cases and legal writings on the problem
he has at hand.
But the criticisms that can be made of either of these two books are trivial when
compared with their merits. A teacher of a course on trade regulations ought to be
profoundly grateful if he had the use of only one of these books, when he has the opportunity to choose between them, and to use the best of each to guide his own thinking
on the subject, he must realize how fortunate he is.
H. L. McCINTocK*
How Lawyers Think. By Clarence Morris. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
,937. PP. 144. $'~.SO
There seems to be an inverse relation between the ability to expound a systematic
theory of an art and successful work in that art. The greatest advances in science
have been made by men who either have no explicit theories of scientific method or
who, when they talk about 'how they think' at all, talk badly. The world's greatest
music and poetry have been the work of men who had no dearly formulated theories
of these arts. Political scientists have not built empires and there appears to be little
connection between the acquisition of great wealth and the ability to formulate economic theories systematically. It is obvious, then, that to do or make things well one
need not be able to make explicit the nature of one's activity. However, in order to
communicate to others what it means to do or make things weil, one must be able to
exhibit the principles of the art he is attempting to teach. Mr. Morris's book, How
Lawyers Think, undertakes to do this for the art of "legal problem solving."
He says, "It is an attempt to generalize expressly on the subject of the solution of
legal problems so that the student of the law may have a systematic theory which may
be useful in formulating or criticizing habits of thought." Such a theory Mr. Morris
attempts to provide by a few hundred words each on such topics as "The Natural
History of Problem Solving," "Past Experience and Present Problems," "Logic and
the Solution of Problems," "Immediate Inference," "Syllogisms and Problem Solving," "Classification and Definition," "The Extension and Intension of Terms," "Inductive Logic," and "Theory and Reasoning." The briefness of Mr. Morris's presentation is not due to his skill in grasping essentials nor to his extraordinary capacity for
contracted exposition. On the contrary, despite the slightness of his book, it wanders
at random high above 'the surface of dozens of the chief problems of metaphysics,
* Professor of Law, University. of Minnesota Law School.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
psychology, logic, grammar, and legal casuistry. The author is unaware of when he is
hovering over any of these problems and hence of the relations between them.
The student who looks to this book for a systematic theory will find instead a few
commonplace remarks about what is involved in thinking. In addition to this, he will
find a few disconnected bits of information which he might otherwise have gleaned
from a hasty reading of contemporary textbooks in logic. The student will find that
"legal thinking, like all purposive thinking, is directed toward the solution of problems." He will discover the simplest figure of the syllogism, that words can be used
with a variety of meanings, and that to assert that all S is P implies some S is P, whereas to assert that some S is P does not imply all S is P. He will see, too, that these things
have something to do with applying rules of law to particular cases. Assuming that he
has an ordinary man's intelligence and familiarity with the law, the student will not
learn a thing from this book that he did not know before he read it. In so far as the
book contributes anything to its purpose, it does so by furnishing another example
which illustrates the importance of having an explicit theory of critical thinking before
one attempts to communicate it to others.
No lawyer thinks the way Mr. Morris says lawyers do, nor would they want to if
they could. Thinking is not a matter of making definitions in one place, classifying
things in another, inferring in a third, and making practical judgments in some fourth
place. How these activities are organically related to each other and to the use of
language, a systematic exposition of the nature of thinking should make dear. Mr.
Morris's book does not do this.
It is dear that lawyers may be successful without ever having engaged in any special
study of philosophy or of the arts of logic, grammar and rhetoric. This is not the place
to consider whether the study of philosophy and special training in these arts would
either produce better lawyers according to contemporary standards or produce a different kind of lawyer altogether. However, those who hold to either of these positions
dearly will receive no encouragement from Mr. Morris's book. If the relations between
the study of philosophy, logic, grammar and rhetoric and the solution of legal problems
are as trivial and insignificant as they appear to be in Mr. Morris's presentation, legal
educators and practitioners are thoroughly justified in not giving these studies even
the slightest consideration. Philosophy and the liberal arts might well say of some of
their friends as Voltaire said of his, "God protect me from them; I'll take care of my
enemies myself."
ARnmu L. H. Rv~flq*
Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law. By Eugen Ehrlich, translated by
Walter L. Moll, with an introduction by Roscoe Pound. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1936. Pp. xxxvi, 541.
Eugen Ehrlich's book is one, the reading of which can afford great pleasure and instruction, but only at the cost of unusual patience and concentration. It is an utterly
unsystematic book. It contains twenty-one chapters which follow each other in a sequence, the logic of which is not apparent to the reader.! The author remarks in pass* University of Chicago.
'The German original, published in 1913, contains neither an index nor an analysis of chapters. The addition of both to the English version of Ehrlich's book is a great improvement.
If I may offer advice to the reader it is this. Read first the last two chapters of the book which

